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For a South African constitutional lawyer, watching from afar, the current debate
in Germany on the removal of the word “race” from section 3 of article 3 of the
German Basic Law, is perplexing. In the South African context, a similar call would
widely be viewed as a regressive step aimed at protecting white privilege and
reinforcing the social and economic dominance of the white minority. The South
African and German contexts and histories differ, and the word “race” might have
different connotations in German than it has in English, but it may nevertheless be
of interest to consider why the words “race”, 1)I put “race”, “black” and “white” in
inverted commas throughout this piece to signal that “race” is a construct and does
not say anything profound or accurate about any individual, while acknowledging that
“race” has profound material effects. It is not real but it has real-life consequences. 
 “racial” and “non-racialism” are mentioned in several provisions of the South African
Constitution.
The South African Constitution was drafted in response to the country’s history of
colonial conquest and, later during the apartheid era, the legal enforcement of the
system of racial segregation. South Africa’s Constitutional Court endorses this view
and often invokes South Africa’s apartheid past when interpreting the provisions of
the Constitution, stating that the Constitution is aimed at preventing the recurrence
of past unjust practices. 2)On the use of history see for example S v Zuma 1995
(4) BCLR 410 (SA) (CC) par 15, per J Kentridge. (‘…regard must be paid to the
legal history, traditions and usages of the country concerned…’); S v Makwanyane
1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) par 39, per P Chaskalson. (‘we are required to construe
the South African Constitution… with due regard to our legal system, our history
and circumstances …’); and par 264, per D P Mahomed. (‘It is against this historical
background and ethos that the constitutionality of capital punishment must be
determined.’); par 322–23, per J O’Regan. (‘… the values urged upon the Court are
not those that have informed our past…’ and in ‘…interpreting the rights enshrined
in Chapter 3, therefore, the Court is directed to the future’.). See also Pierre de Vos
‘A Bridge Too Far?: History as Context in the Interpretation of the South African
Constitution’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 1. The specific
references to “race” in the South African Constitution fulfil two functions. First, they
aim to prevent the perpetuation of public and private forms of racial discrimination
and racism. Second, they aim to address the effects of past and ongoing racial
discrimination and racism by allowing or mandating race-based redress measures to
correct the racial injustices of the past. To illustrate, I will now discuss some of the
provisions in the South African Constitution that explicitly mention “race”.
Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits “unfair discrimination” against anyone on
one or more grounds, including on the ground of “race”. This section does not only
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bind the state, but also private parties, in recognition of the fact that racism and
racial discrimination lingers on long after the abolition of discriminatory legislation
and policies. (Some academic commentators critical of South Africa’s constitutional
project go further, suggesting that racism and white supremacy are part of the
foundation on which “Western constitutionalism” is built. 3)Joel M. Modiri “Conquest
and constitutionalism: first thoughts on an alternative jurisprudence” vol. 34 (2018)
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 300-325 The absence of any reference
to “race” in the Constitution, so the argument goes, would create a constitutional
silence about racism (especially by private parties) and its devastating effects. This
is a silence that may well benefit the social and economically dominant group (which
would be “white” people), by promoting the idea that the non-recognition of “race”
would strike a blow against racism, when it would in fact serve to hide the problem of
racism.
The prohibition against racial discrimination contained in section 9(3) of the
Constitution, must be read in conjunction with section 9(2). The latter section
specifically permits the state to take redress measures “designed to protect or
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
may be taken”. Such measures include so called “affirmative action” measures
based on “race”. The drafters of the Constitution insisted on the inclusion of this
provision to ensure the Constitution did not prevent the state and other parties
from addressing the effects of past and continued racial discrimination and racism.
Section 9(2) is based on the premise that the abolition of racial discrimination does
not automatically lead the eradication of racism and of racial discrimination by
both the state and by private parties. (As the global protests under the banner of
“Black Lives Matter” illustrate, informal or private racism and racial discrimination
against black people also persist across the globe, despite the absence of racially
discriminating legislation or policies.)
Section 9(3) and 9(2), must also be read in conjunction with section 9(1) which
provides that: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law.” South Africa’s Constitutional Court held in Minister of Finance
v Van Heerden that there was no conflict between the general claim to equality
before the law, on the one hand, and the enforcement of race-based redress
measures on the other. This is because race-based redress measures were not,
as some critics argue, a form of “reverse discrimination” or “positive discrimination”,
but a requirement to achieve the goal of equality before the law.. In this view, in
order to achieve equality, it is essential to recognise the concept of “race” and to
use it to undo the effects of past and ongoing racism and racial discrimination. The
Constitutional Court explained in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden that:
“the provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) are complementary; both contribute
to the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure “full and equal enjoyment
of all rights”… Equality before the law protection in section 9(1) and measures to
promote equality in section 9(2) are both necessary and mutually reinforcing but may
sometimes serve distinguishable purposes.”
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“Race” is also mentioned in section 16(1) of the Constitution. Section 16  guarantees
for everyone the right to freedom of expression. However, section 16(2) lists types of
expression that are not protected, and this excluded expression includes (in section
16(2)(c)) “advocacy of hatred that is based on race”, and “that constitutes incitement
to cause harm”. Once again, the section recognises the harmful effects of racism
and invoke “race” as a category to allow the legislature to pass legislation to protect
individuals against the effect of racial hatred.
Other provisions in the Constitution also permit “race” to be taken into account when
appointing individuals to various institutions. Most notably, section 174(2) of the
Constitution states that the “need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and
gender composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are
appointed”. At the time when this provision was adopted, more than 90% of South
African judges were “white” and male, despite the fact that less than 10% of the
population are “white”. The provision was included to help correct this historical
injustice, caused again by formal racial discrimination during the apartheid era and
lingering racism after apartheid laws were abolished.
Given the various constitutional provisions referencing “race”, and given the
jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court, it was not surprising when last
week a court, while considering whether regulations allowing the government to
use “race” as one of the criteria in allocating Covid-19 related financial aid, affirmed
that the South African Constitution, read as a whole, “cannot be construed as a
libertarian constitution” 4)The court referred to the various social and economic rights
provisions in the Bill of Rights, including the right of access to housing (section 26,
and the right of access to health care (section 27) to justify this claim. nor as a “race-
neutral” Constitution. To ignore race, according to the court,  would be to ignore
the country’s “egregious history in which race overlaid by class and gender was the
central determinants of the distribution of resources in our society for more than 300
years of its existence.”
The fact that the South African Constitution is not “race-neutral” does not mean that
“race” ought to guide the manner in which relations among people in society should
be structured in the long run. The long term aim of the Constitution is to create a
“non-racial” society in which the importance of “race” would fade away. This is why
section 1 of the Constitution lists “non-racialism” as one of the founding values of the
Constitution. (Section 1 is “super entrenched” and can only be amended with a 75%
majority vote in the lower house of Parliament.)
Non-racialism means different things to different people. 5)Peter Ratcliffe Race,
Ethnicity and Nation: International Perspectives on Social Conflict (2005) at p 80 It
could denote a belief that “race” does not exist and that the law should not recognise
“race” in any form to categorise people or their experiences. This view is often
dismissed by South African scholars as a “colour blind” approach which denies the
reality that race – and its twin, “racism” – have a profound impact on people’s lives
and their life-chances. 6)Tracy S Robinson “Race, Rights and Representation in a
Cape Town Magistrate’s Court: Is a Colour Blind Constitutional Discourse Possible in
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Post-Apartheid South Africa?” vol. 13 (1997) South African Journal on Human Rights
pp 581-601.
South Africa’s Constitutional Court has adopted another view on non-racialism which
is also the dominant view in South African political discourse. In this view “non-
racialism” is an ideal, but one that can only be reached by accepting the reality that
“race” has a profound effect on how we view people, how the world is arranged, and
what life-chances individuals enjoy. In other words, in order to create a non-racial
society, it is necessary to acknowledge and deal with the effects of lingering racism
and formal and informal racial discrimination. To do that, one has to acknowledge
that “race” continues to have real-life consequences. The Constitutional Court
explained this in in its 2004 judgment in Minister of Finance and Other v Van
Heerden as follows:
“However, it is also clear that the long-term goal of our society is a non-racial, non-
sexist society in which each person will be recognised and treated as a human being
of equal worth and dignity. Central to this vision is the recognition that ours is a
diverse society, comprised of people of different races, different language groups,
different religions and both sexes. This diversity, and our equality as citizens within it,
is something our Constitution celebrates and protects.”
One way to understand this approach is to distinguish, on the one hand, between
the notion that “race” is an invented or constructed concept which does not say
anything profound or accurate about any human being, and, on the other hand, the
idea that “race” may be an invented concept, but nevertheless has material effects,
which means avoiding the use of “race” as a legal concept would make it difficult,
if not impossible, for the law to respond to the consequences of racism and white
supremacy.
In this view “race” has been used in the past, and continues to be used (also by
private parties), to discriminate directly and indirectly against people who are “black”.
“Race” may be a construct, but to ignore the many ways in which “race” impacts on
the lived reality of those on the receiving end of racism and racial discrimination,
is to condone existing racial inequality. This view is captured by former Chief
Justice Ngcobo in the judgment of Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others where he states:
“In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from other constitutions which
assume that all are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing inequalities. Our
Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched
by the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action being
taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more than that. The effects of
discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a commitment to end it.” At
the heart of this approach is an acknowledgement that the constitutional claim that
everyone is equal before the law is the expression of an ideal, not a description of
reality. Everyone is not equal before the law, partly because of the way in which
“race” and racism impact differently on different people. In this view, the claim that
we are all equal before the law – while racism, among other things, makes this
impossible – and that “race” does not exist, is a dangerous one as it may serve to
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hide the many different ways in which racism impacts on people who are not “white”.
In short, this is a view that a “colour-blind” approach to “race” inevitably leads to
turning a blind eye to racism and its consequences.
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